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Abstract 
This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monopolistic 
competition and producer currency pricing.  A quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived 
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there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the 
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The national economies that make up the world economy have be-
come increasingly interdependent. Monetary policy in each country af-
fects economic welfare both at home and abroad: the policymaker in
each country generates externalities for the policymakers in the other
countries. Therefore, the policymaker in each country must take ac-
count of the actions of policymakers in other countries.1
The previous quotation outlines the basic idea behind the literature on in-
ternational monetary policy cooperation in the 80s and 90s. The existence of
externalities, whether positive or negative, is the source of a need of international
monetary cooperation when countries do not internalize the e¤ects of their actions
on other countries.
In this study, we depart from the previous literature, discussed among others
in Canzoneri and Gray (1985), Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) and Persson and
Tabellini (1995), by considering a two-country model in which both the structure
of the economy and the welfare criteria of the policymakers are derived from mi-
crofoundations. We revisit the scope for international monetary policy cooperation
in a world in which goods and capital markets are perfectly integrated and where
the disturbances that a¤ect the economies originate from productivity, public ex-
penditure and mark-up shocks.
We are not the rst to address this issue in a microfounded model.2 However,
our contribution to the literature is to use a linear-quadratic solution method,
as discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2004), to allow a direct comparison of the
objective functions of the policymakers and the structure of the economies with the
ones that were assumed in the previous literature. In a two-country open economy
model, we derive quadratic objective functions for policymakers that maximize
the utility of the agents that live in their own country. These objectives are not
1Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), pg. 1.
2Our approach follows recent contributions in the open-macro literature which have studied
the analysis of international monetary cooperation with microfounded models and utility-based
welfare criteria, as Benigno and Benigno (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Devereux and Engel
(2003), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), Sutherland (2002a, 2002b), Tille (2003). However, di¤erently
from these analyses, we characterize a dynamic model in which prices are sticky and staggered
following the Calvo (1983) model and we allow for a more general structure of the economy, in
terms of preferences and shocks. With the use of numerical methods, Kollman (2003), Tchakarov
(2003) and Sutherland (2001) have evaluated optimal monetary policies in two-country dynamic
general equilibrium models.
1
only quadratic in domestic output gap and producer ination but contain other
targets for the terms of trade as well as for foreign output gap and foreign producer
ination.
We then analyze the cooperative and non-cooperative allocation. First, our
analysis shows that it is not possible to give a conclusive prescription on which
exchange-rate regime can enforce cooperation except for saying that it should be
contingent on the kind of disturbance that hits the economies. As in Devereux
and Engel (2003) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), the exchange rate should oat
in order to accommodate asymmetric productivity shocks mirroring Friedmans
prescription for exible exchange rates.3 Monetary policymakers are then left
with the role of pursuing the domestic goal of price stability. On the opposite,
when the economy is hit by other shocks, as for example mark-up disturbances,
the optimal cooperative outcome might imply a managed or sometimes a xed
exchange rate regime. Instead, prices and outputs should move to accommodate
the shock. Second, in general our model suggests that there exists gains from
cooperation.4 The driving force steams from the same terms-of-trade externality
that was central in the previous literature. However, the existence of gains from
cooperation can be intuited by studying the interaction between the terms-of-trade
externality and the models distortions given by rigidity in prices and monopoly
power in the goods market.
At a rst sight, these results would suggest that the task of designing insti-
tutions that can implement the cooperative solution is a di¢ cult one, since it
would require to specify some control of the exchange rate conditional on the type
of disturbance that occurs. Despite this initial premise, we show that it is still
possible to design simple monetary institutions that can implement the optimal
cooperative outcome. We appeal to the concept of targeting rules proposed by
Svensson (2002, 2003, 2004) which represent Euler equations that characterize the
optimizing behavior of central banks. In our context, they are constructed using
rst-order conditions of the optimal cooperative allocation following the principles
of Giannoni and Woodford (2002). Our targeting rules can be written as a combi-
3Friedman (1953).
4Indeed, our model has more general preference specications and structure of the shocks
than Devereux and Engel (2003) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002). However, in limiting cases, we
nest their results.
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nation of only domestic targets, both GDP and CPI ination rates and domestic
output, with no explicit reference to the exchange rate.
Our results qualify the general message of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002). Policy-
makers that act in their self interest do not generally achieve outcomes that are
optimal from a global perspective. However it still possible that monetary insti-
tutions can be designed with self-oriented targets that maintain enough exibility
to accommodate also external objectives.
The paper is structured as it follows. Section 1 presents the structure of the
model. Section 2 presents the cooperative and non-cooperative problems. Section 3
solves the problems in a log-linear approximation to the solution under the special
condition that the monopolistic distortions are completely neutralized. Section 4
presents the general case. Section 5 concludes.
1 Structure of the Model
We consider a world economy populated by a measure one of households. The
population on the segment [0; n) belongs to the Home country (H) while the one on
the segment [n; 1] belongs to the Foreign country (F ). Each individual maximizes
the following utility function:
U jt = Et
( 1X
T=t
T t

U(CjT )  V (yT (j) ; iT )
)
,
where the index j denotes a variable that is specic to household j and the index
i denotes a variable specic to the country H or F in which j resides. To clar-
ify the notation that follows i will be replaced by an asterisk when referring to
country F and will be suppressed when referring to country H; Et denotes the
expectation conditional on the information set at date t and  is the intertemporal
discount factor, with 0 <  < 1. Households get utility from consumption and
disutility from producing goods. The function U() is increasing and concave in
the consumption index C which is dened as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of home
and foreign bundles of goods as
Cj 
h
n
1
 (CjH)
 1
 + (1  n) 1 (CjF )
 1

i 
 1
;
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where CjH and C
j
F are consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of di¤erentiated
goods produced respectively in country H and F
CjH 
"
1
n
 1

Z n
o
cj(h)
 1
 dh
# 
 1
, CjF 
"
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
cj(f)
 1
 df
# 
 1
,
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country
and  is the elasticity of substitution between the bundles CH and CF . It is assumed
that there is a continuum of goods produced in country H and F on the respective
segments [0; n) and [n; 1]. All the goods are traded across borders with no trade
frictions. The appropriate consumption-based price indices expressed in units of
the currency of the respective country i are dened as
P i  n(P iH)1  + (1  n) (P iF )1  11  , (1.1)
with
P iH 

1
n
Z n
o
pi(h)1 dh
 1
1 
, P iF 

1
1  n
Z 1
n
pi(f)1 df
 1
1 
,
where pi(h) and pi(f) are prices in units of domestic currency of the home-produced
and foreign-produced goods, respectively. Prices are set in the currency of the
producer and the law of one price holds: p(h) = Sp(h) and p(f) = Sp(f), where
S is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency). Given these assumptions and the structure of preferences, purchasing
power parity holds, i.e. P = SP . Moreover relative prices are independent of the
currency of denomination, which means that when writing relative-price variables
we can suppress the index i.
Finally V () is an increasing convex function of household js supply of one of
the di¤erentiated good y(j) produced in its country and i denotes a generic vector
of shocks (to be specied in the analysis that follows) which are specic to country
i. The total demands of the generic good h, produced in country H, and of the
good f; produced in country F, are respectively:
y(h) =

p(h)
PH
  "
PH
P
 
CW +G
#
, y(f) =

p(f)
PF
  "
PF
P
 
CW +G
#
;
(1.2)
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where CW  R 1
0
Cjdj is aggregate consumption in the world economy and G and
G are country-specic government purchase shocks.
We assume that asset markets are complete both at domestic and international
levels. Households can trade in a set of nominal state-contingent securities de-
nominated in the currency of the home country and they all inherit at time 0
initial state-contingent wealth such that their lifetime budget constraints are iden-
tical. This complete-market assumption implies that consumption risk is perfectly
pooled among households within a country and across countries. It follows that
Cjt = Ct for all j; (1.3)
at all times and across all states of nature. Equation (1.3) is derived from the set
of optimality conditions that characterize the optimal allocation of wealth among
the state-contingent securities, having used the assumption on the initial level of
wealth and the fact that purchasing power parity holds.5 At each time t, there is
one of these conditions for each of the states of nature at time t + 1. The set of
optimality conditions of the householdsbehavior is completed by the appropriate
transversality conditions.
In the analysis that follows, we assume that preferences are isoelastic of the
form
U(Cjt ) 
(Cjt )
1 
1   ; V (yt(j); 
i
t)  (ait) 
(yt(j))
1+
1 + 
;
where ait can be interpreted as a country-specic productivity shock. Here  is the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, with  > 0,
and  is the inverse of the elasticity of goods production,with   0.
Each household is also a monopolistic producer of one of the di¤erentiated
goods. As a monopolistic producer the home household sets its price p(h)taking as
5We do not report these conditions here since they will not be used in the analysis that follows.
Nor we report the standard stochastic Euler equations, which are implied by these conditions
and which are used to price the risk-free nominal interest rates. Indeed they will be needed only
to determine the optimal path of the interest rates in a residual way, once the optimal paths of
ination, relative prices and consumption are determined. Our model can be interpreted as a
cashless limiting model (as in Woodford, 2003, chapter 2), in which the remuneration of money
is equal to that of a one-period-maturity risk-free nominal bond in a way that the opportunity
cost of holding money is zero.
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given P; PH ; PF and C: The price-setting behavior is modelled following a mech-
anism á la Calvo (1983) according to which each seller has the opportunity to
change its price with a given probability 1   . We allow for di¤erent i across
countries. When a household in the home country has the opportunity to set a new
price in period t; it does so in order to maximize the expected discounted value of
its net prots. The price setting decision at time t determines the net prots at
time T with T > t only in states of nature in which the seller does not change the
price from t + 1 to T inclusive: this occurs with probability T t. The objective
function is then6
Et
1X
T=t
()T t

UC(CT )
PT
(1  T )~pt(h)~yt;T (h)  V (~yt;T (h); T )

,
where after-tax revenues are converted in units of utility through the marginal
utility of nominal income, UC(CT )=PT , which is the same for all households be-
longing to a country because of the complete-market assumption;  t denotes a
time-varying tax on sales;7 ~pt(h) denotes the price of the good h chosen at date
t in the producer currency and ~yt;T (h) is the total demand of good h at time T
conditional on the fact that the price ~pt(h) has not changed,
~yt;T (h) =

~pt(h)
PH;T
  "
PH;T
PT
 
CT +GT
#
: (1.4)
The optimal choice of ~pt(h) is
~pt(h) =
Et
P1
T=t()
T tVy(~yt;T (h); T )~yt;T (h)
Et
P1
T=t()
T t 1
T
UC(CT )
PT
~yt;T (h)
, (1.5)
where 1=t has been dened as
1
t
 (1   t)(   1)

:
6All households within a country that can modify their price at a certain time face the same
discounted value of the streams of current and future marginal costs under the assumption that
the new price is maintained. Thus they will set the same price.
7We introduce a time-varying tax on sales to obtain ine¢ cient uctuations in the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and goods production. We could have obtained the same
outcome by introducing heterogenous labor market in each industry and having a time-varying
monopoly power of wage setters as in Clarida et al. (2002) and Woodford (2003). Giannoni (2000)
obtains the same outcome by using a time-varying elasticity of substitution . To complete the
characterization of the model, we assume that there are lump-sum taxes that can be levied in a
way that the governments intertemporal budget constraint is satised.
6
In particular t can be interpreted as the ine¢ cient wedge in the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and goods production when prices are exible.
In what follows we will refer to uctuations in this wedge as mark-up shocks.
Given Calvos mechanism, the evolution of the price index PH is described by the
following law of motion
P 1 H;t = P
1 
H;t 1 + (1  )~pt(h)1 . (1.6)
Similar conditions hold for the producers in country F , with the appropriate mod-
ications.
2 Objectives and strategies in the cooperative
and non-cooperative solutions
In this section, we rst specify the objective functions, the constraints and the
strategy space of the policymakers for the cooperative and non-cooperative solu-
tions and then present the solution method for our problems. We assume that the
policy objective for each monetary policymaker is the maximization of the sum of
the expected utilities of the consumers that belong to its country. In the home
country, it corresponds to maximizing
W = Et0
( 1X
t=t0
t t0

U(Ct)  1
n
Z n
0
V (yt (h) ; t)dh
)
which can be rewritten using the assumption of isoelastic preferences as
W = Et0
( 1X
t=0
t t0 [U(Ct)  V (YH;t; t)t]
)
(2.7)
where YH;t is dened by
YH;t 

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct +Gt (2.8)
and t is an index of price dispersion dened as
t  1
n
Z n
0

pt(h)
PH;t
 (1+)
dh  1:
7
When prices are set according to a partial adjustment rule á la Calvo, the index
t evolves according to the following law of motion
t = t 1
(1+)
H;t + (1  )
 
1   1H;t
1  
! (1+)
1 
; (2.9)
where we have used (1.6) and dened H;t  PH;t=PH;t 1.
In the same way, we can write the objective for the foreign policymaker as
W  = Et0
( 1X
t=0
t t0 [U(Ct)  V (Y F;t; t )t ]
)
; (2.10)
where now
Y F;t =

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct +G

t ; (2.11)
and
t = 
t 1(

F;t)
(1+) + (1  )

1  (F;t) 1
1  
 (1+)
1 
; (2.12)
and we have dened F;t  P F;t=P F;t 1: The economy is characterized by the ag-
gregate supply relationships that determine the link between consumption, output
and prices. Given the assumption of isoelastic preferences and the law of motion
(1.6), we can express (1.5) in the following form
1   1H;t
1   =

Ft
Kt
  1
1+
(2.13)
where we have dened
Kt  Et
1X
T=t
()T ta T Y
1+
H;T

PH;T
PH;t
(1+)
; (2.14)
Ft  Et
1X
T=t
()T t 1T C
 
T YH;T

PH;T
PT

PH;T
PH;t
 1
: (2.15)
In the foreign country we obtain that
1  (F;t) 1
1   =

F t
Kt
  1
1+
; (2.16)
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where we have dened
Kt  Et
1X
T=t
()T t(aT )
 (Y F;T )
1+
 
P F;T
P F;t
!(1+)
; (2.17)
F t  Et
1X
T=t
()T t(T )
 1C T Y

F;T

PF;T
PT
 
P F;T
P F;t
! 1
: (2.18)
Finally, using (1.1) we can write the link between relative prices PH=P and PF=P
as
n

PH;t
Pt
1 
+ (1  n)

PF;t
Pt
1 
= 1: (2.19)
Having specied the policy objectives and the constraints that policymakers
face, we now characterize the cooperative and non-cooperative problems. In the
cooperative allocation, countries agree to maximize aggregate welfare WC dened
as a weighted sum of the utilities of the consumers belonging to the world economy:
WC  Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [U(Ct)  nV (YH;t; t)t   (1  n)V (Y F;t; t )t ]: (2.20)
The optimal cooperative allocation is the sequence fxtg, where xt  (Ct,YH;t,YF;t,
t, t , Ft, F

t , Kt, K

t ,PH;t=Pt,PF;t=Pt, H;t, 

F;t); that maximizes (2.20) under
the constraints (2.8), (2.9) and (2.11)(2.19), given the sequences of shocks ft; tg
and the initial conditions t0 1;

t0 1:
8
In order to characterize the non-cooperative allocation, we need to specify the
strategic game. We assume that each policymakers strategy is specied in terms
of each countrys GDP ination rate as a function of the sequence of shocks. In
particular, the home and foreign policymakers set H;t and F;t, respectively, as
H;t = ft(ft; tg) and F;t = f t (ft; tg) where ft() and f t () are time-varying
functions. In particular we have specied that each producer ination rate can
be a time-varying function of all past, present and future shocks that are in the
model.
We assume that policymakers commit at time t0 to their respective sequence of
strategies fft()g and ff t ()g for each t  t0 to maximize their objective functions.
In a Nash game each policymaker maximizes its own utility by choosing a sequence
8The vectors t and 

t include at; Gt; t and a

t ; G

t ; 

t , respectively.
9
of GDP ination rates taking as given the equilibrium sequence of GDP ination
rates of the other policymaker. An implication of our specication of the strategy
space is that we can express the home policymakers optimization problem as maxi-
mizing (2.7) by choosing the sequences fCt; YH;t; YF;t;t;t ; Ft,F t ,Kt,Kt ,PH;t=Pt; PF;t=Pt,
H;tg under the constraints (2.8), (2.9) and (2.11)(2.19), given the sequences of
shocks ft; tg, the initial conditions t0 1;t0 1 and given the sequence of foreign
GDP ination rates fF;tg implied by the strategy of the other policymaker. A
similar problem can be written for the foreign policymaker in maximizing (2.10).
Since the cooperative and non-cooperative problems cannot be solved in a
closed-form solution, we apply an approximation method based on a generaliza-
tion of Taylors approximation theorem.9 In order to apply this method we need
rst to solve the cooperative and non-cooperative allocations for the case in which
the sequence of shocks ft; tg is constant (in what follows we will refer to these
problems as deterministic).10 Indeed, the approximation method requires that
the existence of a well-dened steady-states as a solution for the cooperative and
non-cooperative deterministic problems. Moreover, since the approximation for
the stochastic problems (cooperative and non-cooperative) will be taken around
their respective deterministic steady states, it is necessary that the cooperative
and non-cooperative steady states coincide so that it is possible to compare the
cooperative and non-cooperative allocations in a meaningful way.
In general, there are two issues that make the analysis incompatible with these
two requirements. First, as noted by Kydland and Prescott (1980), given that the
structural constraints (2.14), (2.15), (2.17), (2.18) are forward looking, the opti-
mization problems are not fully recursive, so that the solutions to the deterministic
problems are not necessarily stationary. Second, cooperative and non-cooperative
deterministic solutions can di¤er because of the existence of a contractionary bias
in the non-cooperative solution that does not arise in the cooperative solution, as
discussed in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Benigno (2002). We show that we can
handle both issues by introducing a stronger form of commitment a commitment
from a timeless perspectiveas in Woodford (1999).
9The generalization is to Banach spaces which are the ones that apply to our context as
discussed in Woodford (1986).
10In this deterministic solution, without losing generality, we are assuming at = at = a > 0,
t = 

t =   1; Gt = Gt = G  0.
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In the deterministic cooperative problem, we thus assume that policymakers
face additional constraints on the variables Ft0 ; F

t0
; Kt0 ; K

t0
of the form Ft0 =
F ; F t0 =
F ; Kt0 = K;K

t0
= K such that F= K = 1, F = K = 1: In Appendix
A, we show that given these additional constraints and initial conditions t0 1 =
t0 1 = 1; there exist a stationary sequence for the set of variables xt such that xt =
x, where in particular Ft = F ; F t = F
; Kt = K; Kt = K
, t = t = PH;t=Pt =
PF;t=Pt = H;t = 

F;t = 1 at all times. In the deterministic non-cooperative
problem, we assume that the home policymaker solves the above specied problem
with the additional constraint Ft0 = F ;Kt0 = K such that F= K = 1, while
the foreign policymaker solves its problem with the additional constraints F t0 =
F ;Kt0 =
K such that F = K = 1: We show that in this deterministic non-
cooperative game, a candidate for the Nash equilibrium is the combination of
strategies H;t = F;t = 1 at all times: It follows that the cooperative and non-
cooperative steady states coincide and that there are no gains from cooperation.11
Our nal objective is the to study the approximation for the stochastic prob-
lems around the above well-dened deterministic steady state. Indeed, around
this steady state, we consider bounded deviations of the initial conditions t0 1;
t0 1, Ft0 ; F

t0
; Kt0 ; K

t0
as well as of the sequences of shocks ft; tg from their
steady-state values and study how the sequence fxtg departs from its steady-state
value (in a bounded way) both in the cooperative and non-cooperative allocations.
We aim to analyze how, given these small perturbations to the deterministic prob-
lems, stabilization policies might di¤er depending on the nature of the strategic
interaction (i.e. cooperative versus non-cooperative).
3 Cooperative and non-cooperative allocations:
a special case
We are interested in studying a local approximation to the solution of the above
non-linear stochastic problems. In particular we aim to characterize a rst-order
approximation around the deterministic steady state described in the previous sec-
tion. As shown in Benigno and Woodford (2004), this log-linear solution can be
11This statement will be better qualied in the next section when we consider the possibility
for policymakers to react to sunspot shocks.
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obtained by solving a linear-quadratic problem. The characterization of the non-
linear stochastic problem in a linear-quadratic framework allows us to compare
our objective functions and structural equations to the ones adopted in the previ-
ous approach to international monetary policy coordination as in Canzoneri and
Henderson (1991).
As we described in details in appendix B, our linear-quadratic representation
is obtained by taking a second-order approximation to the objective functions and
to the structural constraints. We then use the second-order approximation to the
structural constraints to substitute out the rst-order terms in the approximation
of the objective function with only second-order terms. In this way, we show that
we can obtain an objective function which is purely quadratic and that can be
correctly evaluated by only a log-linear approximation to the structural constraints.
The solution to this problem (i.e. the linear-quadratic one) gives us a log-linear
approximation to the solution of the non-linear problems described in the previous
section.
3.1 Cooperative solution
To get more intuition, we consider the simple case in which the steady-state mo-
nopolistic distortions are o¤set by appropriate taxation subsidies, i.e.  = 1: First,
we focus on the characterization of the optimal cooperative solution. In this case
the quadratic approximation of the objective function for the cooperative problem
assumes the following form (see Appendix B):
LW =
1
2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [nwy (Y^H;t   ~Y wH;t)2 + (1  n)wy (Y^ F;t   ~Y wF;t)2+
+n(1  n)sc wy (T^t   ~Twt )2 +
ns2c

wy 
2
H;t +
(1  n)s2c

wy 
2
F;t]; (3.21)
where sc represents the steady-state share of consumption over output, sc = C= Y ,
wy = (sc + )s
 2
c > 0 and we have dened   (1   )=(s 1c + ) and i 
(1   i)(1   i)(s 1c + )=[i(1 + )]. Variables with the hat denotes log-
deviations of the respective variable from the steady state while we have dened
H;t  lnH;t, F;t  lnF;t and Tt = PF;t=PH;t: The variables ~Y wH;t, ~Y wF;t, ~Twt are
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the following functions of the shocks12
~Y wH;t  sc ~Ct + (1  n)sc ~Twt + G^t;
~Y wF;t  sc ~Ct   nsc ~Twt + G^t ;
~Twt =

(1 + sc)
[a^R;t   G^R;t];
where ~Ct is given by
~Ct  
(sc + )

a^W;t   G^W;t

:
The variables ~Y wH;t, ~Y
w
F;t, ~T
w
t can be interpreted as the desired targets that policy-
makers wish to achieve in a cooperative agreement for domestic output, foreign
output and the terms of trade respectively. When  = 1, these targets coin-
cide with the exible-price allocation that would arise when there are no mark-up
shocks.
The quadratic loss function (3.21) can be evaluated by only a log-linear approx-
imation to the structural constraints (2.8), (2.11) and (2.13)(2.19). In particular
by log-linearizing (2.13)(2.15) and (2.16)(2.18) using (2.19) and the denition
T  PF=PH , we obtain the two aggregate supply relationships:
H;t = [(Y^H;t   ~Y wH;t) + (1  n) (T^t   ~Twt ) + ut] + EtH;t+1; (3.22)
F;t = 
[(Y^ F;t   ~Y wF;t)  n (T^t   ~Twt ) + ut ] + EtF;t+1; (3.23)
for country H and F , respectively: By log-linearizing (2.8) and (2.11) we obtain a
relation between terms of trade and output di¤erence across countries as
(T^t   ~Twt ) =  1s 1c [(Y^H;t   ~Y wH;t)  (Y^ F;t   ~Y wF;t)]: (3.24)
In particular, in equations (3.22) and (3.23) ut and ut are just proportional to the
mark-up shocks
ut =
^t
(sc + )
; ut =
^t
(sc + )
: (3.25)
12We have dened a^W;t  na^t+(1 n)a^t , G^W;t  nG^t+(1 n)G^t ; a^R;t  a^t a^t ; G^R;t  G^t G^t
with G^t  (Gt   G)= Y and G^t  (Gt   G)= Y :
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By specifying a path for H;t and F;t, the variables Y^H;t, Y^

F;t and T^t can be deter-
mined by (3.22)-(3.24) and this is all that is needed to evaluate (3.21). Finally we
need to consider the constraints implied by the timeless perspectivecommitment
on the initial conditions H;t0 and 

F;t0
given by H;t0 = H;t0 and 

F;t0
= F;t0 :
13
As in the closed-economy model of Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone
(2002), in the AS equations (3.22) and (3.23) GDP ination rates depend on the
present discounted value of the aggregate real marginal costs. In general, in open
economies, real marginal costs are not only proportional to the output gap but
they also depend on relative prices, namely the terms of trade. (see Svensson,
2000.) This dependence captures the expenditure-switching e¤ect; only in the
special case in which  = 1 the terms of trade channel disappears. Equations
(3.22) and (3.23) replace the traditional expectations-augmented Phillips-curve in
the models of Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) and Persson and Tabellini (1995,
1996). Equation (3.24) captures the relation between terms of trade and output
di¤erential across countries. This relation is also familiar to the previous literature.
The restriction  = 1 implies also that the terms of trade is no longer a
target in the loss function (3.21), since  = 0. In general, however, terms-of-trade
volatility with respect to its desired target can be a cost or a benet depending
on the sign of the term  . Since  can be negative, it might seem that our
minimization problem is not necessarily well behaved since the loss function might
not be convex. However, when  = 1, monopolistic distortions are completely
neutralized in a way that the steady state is e¢ cient from a cooperative perspective.
Thus, any uctuation around this steady state is costly.14
The optimal stabilization problem can be characterized in a simple way in the
absence of mark-up disturbances, i.e. ^t = ^

t = 0. In this case, by inspecting
(3.22)(3.24), it can be easily seen that H;t = F;t = 0 minimize completely the
13In particular H;t0 and 

F;t0
represent the log-linear approximation to initial commitments
to the variables Ft0=Kt0 and F

t0=K

t0 . Here H;t0 and 

F;t0
are functions of predetermined and
exogenous variables that will be self-consistent in the equilibrium in the sense that they will be
the same functions that will result in equilibrium at later dates. (see Woodford, 2003, chapter 7)
14A formal proof can be done in the following way. Rewrite the loss function in terms of the
targets C^t  ~Cwt , T^t  ~Twt , H;t, F;t, and note that all the coe¢ cients are now positive. The loss
function is then convex. Indeed in the same way the aggregate supply equations can be written
in terms of the above four variables. These two aggregate supply equations are all that is needed
to evaluate this modied loss function.
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loss function and achieve the rst-best. In particular the optimal cooperative al-
location replicates the exible-price outcome. This is not a surprise, since both
the steady-state is e¢ cient and there is no trade-o¤ because of further ine¢ cien-
cies due to the shocks. Indeed the existence of mark-up shocks would create an
ine¢ cient wedge in the marginal rate of substitution between goods consumption
and production. Absent this friction it is then optimal to stabilize the remaining
shocks as in the exible-price allocation. At the same time setting H;t = F;t = 0
eliminates the price-dispersion distortion due to staggered pricing mechanism im-
plicit in the Calvos adjustment rule. In the optimal cooperative allocation (absent
mark-up shocks), since producer prices are xed, the nominal exchange rate moves
to accommodate asymmetric shocks in the following way
lnSt= S =

1 + sc
[a^t   a^t   (G^t   G^t )]: (3.26)
When the home country has a favorable productivity shock, the home currency de-
preciates so that the demand for the home-produced goods can increase. The same
e¤ect follows a decrease in home government purchases. These ndings support
the Friedmans argument for having oating exchange rate regime. Moreover, to
enforce the optimal cooperative solution is su¢ cient that each country stabilizes
its own producer ination rate. As in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), self-oriented
policymakers can achieve the rst best.
On the other hand, when the economy is subject to mark-up uctuations, then
monetary policymakers have a role in stabilizing those ine¢ ciencies and move away
from the exible price allocation. To study the optimal cooperative allocation in
this more general case, we write the following Lagrangian:
L = Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0wy [
1
2
ny2H;t +
1
2
(1  n)y2F;t +
1
2
n(1  n)sc q2t +
1
2
ns2c

2H;t+
+
1
2
(1  n)s2c

2F;t] + n'1;t[
 1H;t   yH;t   (1  n) qt    1H;t+1]+
+(1  n)'2;t[ 1F;t   yF;t + n qt    1F;t+1] + n(1  n)'3;t[qt+
  1s 1c yH;t +  1s 1c yF;t]  n'1;t0 1 1H;t0   (1  n)'2;t0 1 1F;t0 ;
where we have dened yH;t  (Y^H;t   ~Y wH;t), yF;t  (Y^ F;t   ~Y wF;t) and qt  (T^t   ~Twt )
and we have appropriately normalized the Lagrangian multiplier in a way to obtain
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time-invariant rst-order conditions. The rst-order condition with respect to yH;t,
yF;t and qt are
wy yH;t = '1;t + (1  n) 1s 1c '3;t; (3.27)
wy y

F;t = '2;t   n 1s 1c '3;t; (3.28)
wy sc qt =  '1;t    '2;t   '3;t; (3.29)
for each t  t0, while the ones with respect to H;t and F;t are
wy s
2
cH;t =  ('1;t   '1;t 1); (3.30)
wy s
2
c

F;t =  ('2;t   '2;t 1); (3.31)
for each t  t0.
We show in appendix A that equations (3.27)(3.31), combined with the struc-
tural equations (3.22)(3.24) and the initial conditions '1;t0 1 and '2;t0 1 determine
the equilibrium path of outputs, ination rates, and terms of trade along with the
Lagrangian multipliers. When  = 1, we show (see Appendix B) that the nominal
exchange rate follows
lnSt= S =

1

  1
sc

s2c
(+ sc)
('1;t   '2;t) +

1 + sc
[a^t   a^t   (G^t   G^t )]:
We note here that when sc =  and there are only mark-up shocks, then the
optimal cooperative solution would require to x the exchange rate. Otherwise,
when there are no mark-up shocks then '1;t = '2;t = 0 at each time and the
exchange rate will follow (3.26).
In order to study the optimal transmission mechanism of shocks, we calibrate
a quarterly model for countries with equal size, i.e. n = 1=2. Following Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), we set  = 0:99 and  = 0:47. We assume  = 0:66
and  = 0:75 implying an average length of price contracts equal to 3 and 4,
respectively. We then assume that the elasticity  across goods produced within
a country is 10, while  in this case is equal to 1. The steady-state level of
consumption over output is calibrated to sc = 0:8. Finally, the risk aversion
coe¢ cient  is usually assumed to be in a range between 1 and 5, and we use 3, while
following Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
 is in the range 3 to 6 and we choose 4:5. An important implication of this
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Figure 1: Figure 1: Impulse responses of home and foreign outputs, home and
foreign GDP ination rates, terms of trade and exchange rate to a home mark-up
shock.
calibration is that  > 1

, i.e. the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is higher
than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which means that the home and
foreign bundles of goods are substitute in the utility.15
Figure 1 presents the impulse responses following a positive one-time mark-up
shock in the domestic economy. In a similar way to the closed-economy model
of Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003, ch. 3), a mark-up shock in the
home country is absorbed by a temporary fall in the home output gap and by
an initial jump in home GDP ination rate. After the shock, the output gap
15Two goods are substitute in the utility when the marginal utility of one good decreases as
the consumption of the other good increases.
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converges back to the initial steady state and the price level converges as well
to the initial level through periods of deation. The fall in the output worsen
the home country terms of trade (T^ decreases). The key insight to understand
the optimal transmission mechanism of the mark-up shock across countries is the
link between foreign real marginal costs and the terms of trade. When goods are
substitute in utility, an improvement in the foreign terms of trade (T^ decreases)
reduces the real marginal costs for foreign producers, acting as a negative mark-up
shock for them. Producer prices fall and the output gap rises. Home and foreign
output gaps and the two GDP ination rates commove in a negative way following
the shock. Under a di¤erent parametrization,  < 1

, the co-movement would be
positive, while no spillover e¤ect would occur if  = 1

. In the calibrated example
the exchange rate appreciates but moves less than in the case the economy is hit
by a productivity shock. Most interesting, following any kind of stationary shock,
the optimal cooperative solution requires both prices and exchange rate to revert
back to their initial values.
3.2 Non-cooperative allocation
We now analyze the approximation to the non-cooperative stochastic problem to
study the existence of gains from cooperation. Moreover our framework allows us to
discuss the form of policymakersobjective functions when they do not cooperate.
As before, we initially focus on the case in which  = 1. As detailed in the appendix
B, the loss function for the policymaker in the home country is
L =
1
2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [yh(Y^H;t  ~Y hH;t)2+yf (Y^ F;t  ~Y hF;t)2+q(T^t  ~T ht )2+h2H;t+f2F;t]
(3.32)
while for the policymaker in the foreign country is
L =
1
2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [yh(Y^H;t  ~Y fH;t)2+yf (Y^ F;t  ~Y fF;t)2+q(T^t  ~T ft )2+h2H;t+f2F;t]
(3.33)
where iyh, 
i
yf
, iq, 
i
h
, if are parameters, dened in the appendix A, and
~Y hH;t,
~Y hF;t, ~T
h
t , ~Y
f
H;t, ~Y
f
F;t, ~T
f
t are combinations of the shocks of the model, dened as well
in the appendix A, and have the interpretation of desired targets for the respective
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variables. We note here that in general these targets might be di¤erent from the
ones implied by the cooperative loss function.
Our approach shows that a quadratic representation of a welfare-based loss
function has a di¤erent form compared to the quadratic objective functions that
have been previously assumed in the literature on international monetary policy
cooperation. In those papers, the loss functions of the policymakers were quadratic
in the deviations of output (or unemployment) with respect to a desiredlevel and
in the CPI ination rate, as in Canzoneri and Gray (1985) and Canzoneri and Hen-
derson (1991). Other studies, as Persson and Tabellini (1995, 1996), have included
also a concern for terms of trade stabilization. In our model the loss functions
of country H and F present the same target variables but with country-specic
weights and desiredtargets. In particular each policymaker should be concerned
about quadratic deviations of both domestic and foreign outputs, domestic and
foreign GDP ination rates and of the terms of trade from their country-specic
desired targets. These expressions di¤er sharply from their closed-economy coun-
terpart, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003, ch. 6) and Be-
nigno and Woodford (2004). In these studies the loss function is usually quadratic
in the ination rate and in the deviation of output with respect to a desired target.
This should be less surprising result once we observe that the objective function
captures the distortions existing in the economy and that the two countries are
interdependent both in the consumption and in the production of goods.16
In the linear-quadratic approximation to the stochastic non-cooperative prob-
lem, policymaker in country H minimizes (3.32) under the constraints given by
(3.22)-(3.24) by choosing the sequence of its own GDP ination rates fH;tg1t=t0
taking as given the strategy of the other policymaker which implies a given se-
quence of foreign GDP ination rates fF;tg1t=t0 and given the initial conditions
implied by the additional timeless-perspective constraints on H;t0.
Before computing the non-cooperative allocation, a rst important issue to
address is whether the second-order conditions of the above minimization prob-
lem are really satised. As shown in Benigno and Woodford (2004) this question
16In a static model, with prices all xed one-period in advance, Sutherland (2002b) has shown
that home and foreign utility-based welfare criteria depend on foreign and domestic outputs as
well as on the nominal exchange rate.
19
is closely related to the issue of studying whether purely random policy can be
welfare improving. Although we are still assuming  = 1, it might happen that
the steady-state around which the approximation is taken does not satisfy second-
order conditions for being the equilibrium outcome of a Nash game even if it is
the e¢ cient steady state from the cooperative level. The intuition is that when
each policymaker maximizes the welfare of its own country taking as given the
strategy of the other policymaker, it would have incentives to maintain higher
monopolistic distortions, to worsen the terms of trade and shift the burden of
production to the other country, as discussed in Corsetti and Pesenti (2002). In
our context, since we analyze a commitment solutions, policymakers cannot en-
gage in surprise ination or deation; however they might still want to a¤ect
randomly the economy and improve their own welfare. To study this possibility,
we assume that we start with some equilibrium process fH;t, F;t, Y^H;t, Y^ F;t, T^tg
consistent with the constraints (3.22)-(3.24) and we consider the possibility of per-
turbing this equilibrium by adding terms that depend on a sunspot realization
t at some date t > t0. The variable t is assumed to have conditional expecta-
tion zero at date t0 and variance 2 and to be distributed independently of the
processes fH;t, F;t, Y^H;t, Y^ F;t, T^tg and of all the fundamentals shocks. Given
the strategy of the foreign policymaker and the implied sequences of fF;tg, we
assume that the sunspot shock adds a contribution 'jj to H;t+j for each j  0,
where f'jg is an arbitrary sequence of coe¢ cients. This shock adds a contribution
&1
 1('j   'j)t; &2 1('j   'j)t, &3 1('j   'j)t to Y^H;t+j and Y^F;t+j and
T^t+j consistently with (3.22)-(3.24), where &1  (1 + n  1s 1c )=(1 +   1s 1c ),
&2  n  1s 1c =(1 +   1s 1c ), &3   1s 1c =(1 +   1s 1c ). The contribution to
the loss function will be then
t2
1X
j=0
j
"
h'
2
j + y

'j   'j+1

2#
where y  yh&21 + yf &22 + q&23. Randomization will be locally undesirable if
and only if this expression is positive in the case of all possible non-zero bounded
sequences f'jg: Randomization of policy is welfare decreasing if and only if: h
and y are not both equal to zero and either (i) y  0 and h+(1 1=2)2 2y 
0, holds, or (ii) y  0 and h + (1 + 1=2)2 2y  0, holds.
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In a closed economy case, when preferences are isoelastic, the conditions for
randomization to be welfare improving rely on implausible parameters, i.e. high
share of government purchase in steady-state output (see Benigno and Woodford,
2004). In our two-country open-economy model, these conditions are less restric-
tive. In particular a critical parameter is the intratemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion :When  increases q becomes negative and pushes y to be as well negative.
Moreover h becomes negative, too. It then follows that condition (i) is satised
only for low values of  while conditions (ii) is in general never satised. In the
above calibrated example, leaving  as a free parameter, we nd that condition (i)
is satised for  less than 5: Similar procedure for the other country delivers a close
result. This nding points toward the conclusion that policymakers have an incen-
tive to create volatility in excess of fundamentaldisturbances to improve their
own welfare. Indeed, there is a terms-of-trade externality and each policymaker
has an incentive to use its volatility to increase its own expected consumption and
decrease its own expected disutility of production. It is not a surprise that the
elasticity of output toward terms-of-trade movements is the critical parameters
and that for high values of this elasticity the incentives are higher. Absent any
fundamentaldisturbance, when randomization is welfare improving, there is no
Nash equilibrium in which producer ination rates are zero in the deterministic
non-cooperative problem. Our approximation method cannot be used in this case,
except for recognizing the existence of this incentive for policymakers.
When conditions (i) or (ii) hold, we can analyze the equilibrium response to
fundamental shocks in the case countries do not cooperate in a Nash equilibrium.
The minimization problem for the home policymaker can be represented by the
following Lagrangian
L = Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [
1
2
yh(y
h
H;t)
2 +
1
2
yf (y
h
F;t)
2 +
1
2
hq q
2
t +
1
2
h
2
H;t+
+
1
2
f
2
F;t] + 1;t[
 1H;t   yhH;t   (1  n) qht    1H;t+1]+
+2;t[
 1F;t   yhF;t + n qht    1F;t+1] + n(1  n)3;t[qt+
  1s 1c yhH;t +  1s 1c yhF;t]  1;t0 1 1H;t0
where we have dened yhH;t  (Y^H;t   ~Y hH;t), yhF;t  (Y^ F;t   ~Y hF;t) and qht  (T^t   ~T ht )
and we have appropriately normalized the Lagrangian multiplier in a way to obtain
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time-invariant rst-order conditions. The rst-order condition with respect to yH;t,
yF;t; qt and H;t are
yhy
h
H;t = 1;t + 
 1s 1c 3;t;
yfy
h
F;t = 2;t    1s 1c 3;t;
yqq
h
t = (1  n) '1;t    '2;t   '3;t;
yhH;t =   1('1;t   '1;t 1);
for each t  0. In a similar way, we can characterize the rst-order conditions for
the optimization problem of the foreign policymaker. The set of all the rst-order
conditions and the structural constraints determine the non-cooperative allocation.
There are some special cases in which cooperative and non-cooperative allo-
cations coincide. In particular it is necessary that there are no mark-up shocks,
^t = ^

t = 0 at all times. In the previous section, we found that absent mark-up
shocks the exible-price allocation is the optimal cooperative policy, when  = 1.
However even under this restriction and di¤erently from previous ndings (see
Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2002), there can be gains from cooperation. Indeed, each
policymaker has an incentive to use the terms of trade in its favor by shifting the
burden of production to the other country. Since the steady-state is e¢ cient and
randomization of policy is welfare decreasing, it is not possible to engineer surprise
terms-of-trade movements. However, a committed policymaker can appropriately
stabilize the shocks and increase its countrys expected utility of consumption while
reducing the expected disutility of producing goods. As in Henderson and Kim
(1999) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998), the ability to precommit does not prevent
this possibility because the expected values of variables depend on the expected
value of rst-order and second-order terms.17 Indeed, an appropriate stabilization
of the shocks a¤ect the second moments of variables and then the expected level.
There are no gains from cooperation under two special cases. One simple case
is when L = L = LW . This occurs when at the same time  = 1, i.e. preferences
are Cobb-Douglas across home and foreign produced goods, sc = 1, i.e. there is
no steady-state public expenditure, and when there are only productivity shocks,
17Loosely speaking, in a commitment equilibrium the expected value of rst-order terms is
equal to zero, while terms of order higher than the second are not relevant in a second-order
approximation.
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a^t and a^t : We retrieve here the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) case. As discussed in
Benigno and Benigno (2003), there is too much risk-sharing under these parametric
restrictions. Indeed, the expected disutilities of producing goods are equalized
across countries along with the marginal utilities of consumption. In this case the
terms of trade is ine¤ective in stabilizing shocks for its own countrys utility, since
the disutility of goods production is tied across countries. In a numerical example,
Sutherland (2001, 2002b) and Tchakarov (2002) have quantied as important the
gains from cooperation in the case that  di¤ers from 1.
Having observed that the nature of the negative externality lies directly in the
use of the terms of trade, we can look at other cases of absence of gains from co-
operation by focusing on the particular case in which the terms of trade channel is
not e¤ective. The previous literature on international monetary policy cooperation
(see Sachs, 1988) has related the gains of cooperation to a parameter of interde-
pendence that measures the importance of the terms of trade in the transmission
mechanism across countries. In our context, the terms of trade interdependence is
determined by the parameter  : When the intratemporal and intertemporal elas-
ticities of substitution are equal, i.e.  = 1=; then  = 0 and each policymaker
can control its own output by manoeuvring its own GDP ination rate. How-
ever, di¤erently from the previous literature, this case does not necessarily imply
the absence of gains from cooperation. Indeed, as claried in Canzoneri et al.
(2002), the case in which  = 1= describes economies that are independent of the
terms of trade only in goods production, but they are still interrelated in goods
consumption.
Using the denition of the coe¢ cients and variables given in the appendix A
when  = 1=, the cooperative loss function (3.21) simplies to a quadratic form
that displays only GDP ination and output targets, since  = 0, while the loss
functions for each country simplify to
L =
1
2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [yh(Y^H;t   ~~Y hH;t)2 + h2H;t] + t:o:c:
for country H and
L =
1
2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0 [yf (Y^

F;t   ~~Y fF;t)2 + f2F;t] + t:o:c:
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for country F , where t:o:c: denotes terms that are out of the control of the policy-
maker and include foreign GDP ination and output. Note that the targets of the
loss function that can be controlled by the policymakers mirror the ones that can
be found in closed-economy models, as in Woodford (2003, ch. 6), since the objec-
tive function collapses to a standard quadratic function in an appropriately dened
domestic output gap and GDP ination. However, this result does not imply that
cooperative and non cooperative solutions will necessarily coincide, since there
are still spillover e¤ects on consumption. Indeed the central planner weighs each
country disutility of goods production less than what the single country does, since
it recognizes that production in the country is absorbed by consumption in both
economies, while the single country weighs more its disutility of goods production
since it does not internalize the consumption and the utility of consumption of the
other country. Only when the desired targets between the pairs of loss functions
L, LW and L, LW coincide, i.e. ~~Y hH;t = ~Y
w
H;t and
~~Y fF;t =
~Y wF;t; then the cooperative
and non-cooperative equilibria coincide and there are no gains from cooperation.
In appendix B, we show that this happens when sc = 1 along with  = 1= and
there are only productivity shocks.
The analysis of symmetric shocks is also an interesting source of comparisons
with the previous literature. Models in the fashion of Canzoneri and Henderson
(1991) found that the gains from cooperation were arising even with symmetric
disturbances. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) instead show that with symmetric pro-
ductivity shocks there are no gains from cooperation. Here, we nd that this result
holds for symmetric productivity shocks, provided sc = 1. Otherwise, with other
kind of disturbances, as for example mark-up and public expenditure shocks, or
with sc < 1, there are still gains from cooperation even when shocks are global.18
In general, the model analyzed here shows that the conditions under which
there are no gains from cooperation are very restrictive. Although we do not
quantify the magnitude of the gains from cooperation, it is worth mentioning that
public expenditure shocks and mark-up shocks have been found to be important
driving factors of the business cycle, as in Galí et al. (2003). Moreover, some
18Sutherland (2002b) shows that even symmetric productivity shocks may imply gains from
cooperation. His framework is di¤erent from ours: indeed, he considers a structure in which
contingent claims market open after policymakers have chosen their policy strategies.
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simple numerical examples of Canzoneri et al. (2001) and Tchakarov (2002) have
shown that this class of models which rely on microfounded loss functions can
produce larger gains from cooperation than the previous literature did in the 80s
and 90s.
3.3 Targeting rules for international monetary policy co-
operation
In the previous sections, we have considered policymakers that maximize the utility
of the consumers in their respective countries. However, a policymaker that shares
the preferences of the consumers or society does not internalize the negative ex-
ternality that it may impose on other countries so that in general the cooperative
and non-cooperative allocation diverge. How is then possible to design institu-
tions, as central banks, with the right incentives? There are several examples in
the literature in which this issue is solved by delegating a new objective function
to an independent agent, a central bank, as shown in the contributions of Rogo¤
(1985), Persson and Tabellini (1993, 1995, 1996), Walsh (1995), Svensson (1997),
and Jensen (2000, 2002). As discussed in Svensson (2002, 2003), designing institu-
tions by imposing a commitment to a loss function can be interpreted as a general
targeting rule, which is a general operational objective.
Here we follow an alternative and perhaps more direct way to design institutions
through the assignment of specic targeting rules(as proposed in Svensson, 2003)
that each policymaker should follow. These specic targeting rules represent Euler
equations derived from the behavior of optimizing central banks.
Our goal is to design targeting rules that are optimal from the cooperative
perspective. To this end we follow the method proposed by Giannoni andWoodford
(2002). In a linear-quadratic model they show that optimal targeting rules can be
obtained by eliminating the Lagrangian multipliers from the rst-order conditions
of the optimal policy problem. Targeting rules built on this principle present
some desirable characteristics. First, by ensuring that these targeting rules hold
at all times, a determinate rational expectations equilibrium can be achieved and
this equilibrium coincides with the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
Second, these targeting rules are optimal regardless of the statistical properties of
25
the exogenous shocks. They depend on the shocks insofar as the targets specied
in the loss function depend on them.
To derive the desirable targeting rules we use the rst-order conditions (3.27)
to (3.31). First, we take a weighted average with weights n and (1   n) of (3.27)
and (3.28), obtaining
wy [nyH;t + (1  n)yF;t] = n'1;t + (1  n)'2;t: (3.34)
We take the di¤erence of (3.27) and (3.28) and combine it with (3.29), obtaining
wy (yH;t   yF;t) = ('1;t   '2;t); (3.35)
where we have used the fact that yH;t   yF;t = scqt. By using (3.34) and (3.35),
we can obtain
wy yH;t = '1;t;
wy y

F;t = '2;t;
which combined with (3.30) and (3.31) yields the following relation
s2cH;t +yH;t = 0; (3.36)
s2c

F;t +y

F;t = 0: (3.37)
In particular, targeting rule (3.36) should be assigned to the monetary policy-
maker in country H and (3.37) to the policymaker in country F: In appendix A, we
show that by committing to these rules a determinate rational expectations equi-
librium can be achieved that implements the optimal cooperative solution from a
timeless perspective.
The above rules present some other interesting characteristics. For both policy-
makers, they involve the same set of target variables GDP ination and output
with the same combination of weights in the overall targeting rules. However, each
of these target variables enters into the targeting rule in deviation from desired
target that can be country-specic. For both countries, the desired target for
GDP ination is zero, while the desiredtargets for output are in general di¤er-
ent from zero and country-specic. Under our special case in which  = 1; these
rules are similar to closed-economy targeting rules (see Giannoni and Woodford
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(2003)). Most important, even if there are gains from cooperation and the optimal
behavior of the exchange rate depends on the kind of shock, we found that the
optimal targeting rules do not involve any target to the exchange rate but only to
domestic variables.
4 General Case
Having gained some intuition, we now move to the general case in which the
monopolistic distortions are not necessarily neutralized, i.e.  > 1. Under this
more general assumption the cooperative loss function can be written as
LW =
1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t[nwy (Y^H;t   ~Y wH;t)2 + (1  n)wy (Y^ F;t   ~Y wF;t)2+
+n(1  n)wq (T^t   ~Twt )2 + nwh2H;t + (1  n)wf2F;t]; (4.38)
where the parameters wy , 
w
q , 
w
h
, wf and the variables
~Y wH;t, ~Y
w
F;t, ~T
w
t are dened
in appendix B. Here the variables ~Y wH;t, ~Y
w
F;t, ~T
w
t represent the desired targets for
the respective variables when countries cooperate. The countries loss function
are instead of the same form as (3.32) and (3.33) where now the parameters and
targets that are di¤erent function of deepparameters and shocks, as detailed in
appendix B. We now investigate whether previous results hold in this more general
case. We indeed nd that the conditions under which the exible-price allocation
is optimal under cooperation are much more restrictive. In appendix B we prove
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under cooperation, the exible-price allocation is constrained-
optimal when there are no mark-up shocks and either (i)  = 1 or (ii) there are
no government purchases, i.e. sc = 1 and G^t = G^t = 0
When the steady-state is not e¢ cient, but constrained e¢ cient, further require-
ments are needed. Indeed there should be no government purchases. The intuition
is similar to previous analysis. In a cooperative agreement, policymakers aim to
commit to policies that raise the expected level of consumption and output in
both countries, since they are ine¢ ciently low. In general, when  > 1, i.e. the
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steady-state level of output is ine¢ ciently low, stabilization policies can be used
to increase the expected level of output. There is a tension between replicating
the exible-price response to the shocks and stabilizing the shocks appropriately
to increase the expected level of output.19
On the other hand the existence of gains from cooperation does not depend on
the presence of steady-state distortion:
Proposition 2. There are no gains from cooperation when there are no-mark
shocks and government purchases, i.e. ^t = ^

t = G^t = G^

t = 0 and sc = 1, and
either (i)  = 1 or (ii)  = 1:
We now investigate whether the optimal targeting rules change under this more
general case. Using the same method described in the previous section, it is possible
to show that the Lagrangian problem of minimizing (4.38) under the constraints
(3.22)(3.24) and the initial conditions on H;t0 and 

F;t0
yields to the following
targeting rules
(wh + )H;t + 
w
yyH;t   (t   ~t) = 0; (4.39)
(wf + )

F;t + 
w
yy

F;t   (t   ~t ) = 0; (4.40)
where we have used the fact that wq = s
 1
c  [s
2
c
w
y    1(   1)(1  sc)sc(sc +
) 1] and dened  as     1s 1c (   1)(1   sc)(sc +  1) 1where ~t 
(1  n)( ~T t   ~T t 1) and ~t   n( ~T t   ~T t 1):
The above rules present some other interesting characteristics with respect to
the previous case. They involve an additional target in terms of CPI ination rates
in contrast with previous ndings when  = 1. For both policymakers, they involve
the same set of target variables GDP, CPI ination and outputwith the same
combination of weights in the overall targeting rules. As in the previous special
case, each of these target variables enters into the targeting rule in deviation from a
desiredtarget which is instead country specic. For both countries, the desired
target for GDP ination is zero, while the desiredtargets for output and CPI
ination are in general di¤erent from zero and country specic. Most interesting,
19This is not the case when there are productivity shocks since preferences are isoelasticso
that stabilization policies are not e¤ective in increasing the expected level of output.
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the desiredtargets for CPI ination rates move in the opposite direction when
comparing the two countries and implicitly dene a desired path for the exchange
rate such that lnSt= S = ~T t .
Di¤erently from the closed-economy counterpart, our targeting rules in the
general case should include a distinction between GDP and CPI ination rates.
Indeed, in the basic model by Giannoni and Woodford (2003), with only sticky
prices and monopolistic competition, the optimal targeting rule is expressed as a
combination of ination rate and output growth with respect to a desired target.
In their framework there is no distinction between GDP and CPI ination rates.
The extent to which the CPI target is relevant depends on the parameters
of the model and not on the kind of disturbance that a¤ects the economy. The
dependence on CPI target disappears when either steady-state monopolistic dis-
tortions are completely o¤set ( = 1), as shown in the previous section, or the
two economies are independent,  = 1, or when in the steady-state government
purchase is equal to zero, sc = 1. Interestingly, the case  = 1 does not appear
as a case that excludes CPI from the target and in general the conditions that
dene the absence of gains from coordination do not necessarily coincide with the
conditions that exclude CPI ination from the target.
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Figure2: Impulse responses of the target variables and desiredtargets (dash
lines) in the targeting rules following a home mark-up shock.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions following a home mark-up shock.
In this gure we keep the same parametrization as in Figure 1, except for the value
of the steady state monopolistic distortions since we now assume  = 1:38 with
a steady state tax  = 0:2: This gure features the exibility of adopting such
targeting rules: the behavior of each target variable indeed does not necessarily
coincides with their desired level. Focusing on the Home economy we observe that,
following a positive domestic mark-up shock, the desired value for the GDP price
level should not move while its actual GDP price level increases and smoothly
converges towards its long-run desired level. On the other hand the desired output
and CPI price level should fall in the period the shock occurs and converge back
to the initial value once the shock disappears. Instead, the actual values for the
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CPI price level and output fall more and converge slowly towards the initial steady
state with respect to their desired values.
The implementation of these targeting rules can be in principle solved as in
Persson and Tabellini (1995) and Jensen (2000). Central banks are assumed to
be risk neutral and their objective function is designed to be the loss function of
the country plus a penalty determined by a contract which is written in terms of
observable variables.20 Given these modied loss functions, the two central banks,
acting in a non-cooperative equilibrium, implement the cooperative outcome. In
our context, maintaining the assumption that central banks are risk neutral, we
can design contracts of the form i0   i1(it)2 for i = H;F and given parameters
i0 and 
i
1 where 
i
t is dened as the country i targeting rule, e.g. 
H
t  (wh +
)H;t + 
w
yyH;t   (t   ~t). Given these contracts, central banks are forced to
follow the targeting rules. However, the restriction written in the contract is not
stronger than the one implied by adjusting the objective functions of the central
banks using contracts, in the fashion of Persson and Tabellini (1995) and Jensen
(2000). As in these approaches, central banks maintain the exibility implicit in
the targeting rules and moreover the exibility in choosing their instrument to
meet their objectives. However, both our approach and theirs do not really solve
the delegation problem and shift the cooperation problem at the delegation stage.21
5 Conclusions
We have shown that in a two-country general equilibrium model characterized by
goods and nancial markets integration, the e¢ cient paths of the exchange rate
20In Persson and Tabellini (1995, 1996), the contract is restricted to be linear in observed
variables but the optimal contract need to have state-contingent parameters. Jensen (2000)
shows that by assigning quadratic contracts in observed variables the contract can be made
non-state contingent.
21Indeed, each country has no incentive to assign to its central bank that type of contract even
in the case that the other country is behaving in that way. This is discussed extensively in Bilbiie
(2002). One solution would be to follow the folk theorem in delegation games of Fershtman et
al. (1991), as in Persson and Tabellini (1995), and condition the parameters of the contracts,
i0 and 
i
1, to the possible outcomes as in take-it-or-leave-ito¤ers. However, this set of state-
contingent non-linear contracts will be highly unrealistic since part of them is contingent on the
payo¤s, which can be di¢ cult to observe. The other solution, as in Persson and Tabellini (1995),
is to consider a delegation to a common supranational institutions endowed with the cooperative
loss function with the task to design appropriately contracts for the single central banks.
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and prices depend on the source of the disturbance that hits the economy. The
interaction between the existing distortions and source of disturbance generates
in general gains from cooperation so that policymakers that maximize their own
welfare behave ine¢ ciently in the non-cooperative allocation. This lack of coor-
dination can be amended by assigning simple targeting rules to each policymaker
so that the optimal cooperative outcome can be achieved. We have shown that
surprisingly these rules depend only on domestic variables despite full goods and
capital market integration.
Further research should investigate the robustness of these ndings for economies
in which asset markets are incomplete and when consumer prices are less respon-
sive to exchange rate changes as in Devereux and Engel (2003) and possibly also
the interdependence between monetary and scal policies that we have neglected
here.
Another important open issue is the enforcement of the proposed targeting
rules. We have briey addressed this issue acknowledging that, as in previous
contributions in the literature, the cooperation problem is simply shift at the del-
egation stage to a supranational authority.
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A Appendix
Deterministic Solution
In this appendix, we show the existence of a stationary solution for the deter-
ministic version of the cooperative and non-cooperative problems. In the deter-
ministic problem the exogenous shocks at, Gt, t, a

t , G

t , 

t take constant values
such that at = at = a > 0, t = 

t =   1, Gt = Gt = G  0. First,
we start from the cooperative problem and we show that, given initial conditions
t0 1 = 

t0 1 = 1 and initial constraints Ft0 =
F ; F t0 =
F ; Kt0 = K;K

t0
= K
such that F= K = 1, F = K = 1; there exist a stationary sequence for the set of
variables xt such that xt = x, where in particular Ft = F ; F t = F
; Kt = K;
Kt = K
, t = t = PH;t=Pt = PF;t=Pt = H;t = 

F;t = 1 at all times. In the
cooperative deterministic solution, countries agree to maximize
WC 
1X
t=t0
t t0 [U(Ct)  nV (YH;t; )t   (1  n)V (Y F;t; )t ];
under the following constraints
YH;t =

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct + G; (A.1)
t = t 1
(1+)
H;t + (1  )p(H;t) 
(1+)
1  ; (A.2)
p(H;t)
1+
 1 =

Ft
Kt

; (A.3)
Kt = a
 Y 1+H;t + Kt+1
(1+)
H;t+1 ; (A.4)
Ft = 
 1C t YH;t

PH;t
Pt

+  1H;t+1Ft+1; (A.5)
Y F;t =

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct + G; (A.6)
t = 
t 1(

F;t)
(1+) + (1  )p(F;t) 
(1+)
1  ; (A.7)
p(F;t)
1+
 1 =

F t
Kt

; (A.8)
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Kt = a
 (Y F;t)
1+ + Kt+1(

F;t+1)
(1+); (A.9)
F t = 
 1C t Y

F;t

PF;t
Pt

+ F t+1(

F;t+1)
 1; (A.10)
n

PH;t
Pt
1 
+ (1  n)

PF;t
Pt
1 
= 1; (A.11)
where we have dened p(H;t)  1 
 1
H;t
1  and p(

F;t) 
1 (F;t) 1
1  : In what
follows, we attach Lagrange multipliers 1;t, 2;t, 3;t, 4;t, 5;t, 6;t, 7;t, 8;t, 9;t,
10;t, 11;t to the constraints (A.1)(A.11) and we also add multilipliers dated t0
to the initial constraints Kt0 = K, Ft0 = F , K

t0
= K, F t0 =
F . The latter
multipliers are normalized in such a way that the resulting rst-order conditions
take the same form at date t0 as at all future dates. The rst-order condition of
the optimal cooperative problem with respect to Ct yields to
0 = Uc(Ct) 

PH;t
Pt
 
1;t + 
 1C  1t YH;t

PH;t
Pt

5;t  

PF;t
Pt
 
6;t +
+ 1C  1t Y

F;t

PF;t
Pt

10;t;
the one with respect to YH;t yields to
 nVy(YH;t; )t + 1;t   (1 + )a Y H;t4;t    1C t

PH;t
Pt

5;t = 0;
the one with respect to t yields to
 nV (YH;t; ) + 2;t   2;t+1(1+)H;t+1 = 0;
the one with respect to Ft yields to
 

1
Kt

3;t + 5;t    1H;t 5;t 1 = 0;
the one with respect to Kt yields to
Ft
K2t

3;t + 4;t   (1+)H;t 4;t 1 = 0;
the one with respect to H;t yields to
0 =  (1 + )t 1(1+) 1H;t 2;t + (1 + )p(H;t) 
(1+)
1   1 2H;t 2;t
 (1 + ) 
1  
 2
H;t 3;t   (1 + )Kt(1+) 1H;t 4;t 1   (   1) 2H;t Ft5;t 1;
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the one with respect to PH;t
Pt
yields to


PH;t
Pt
  1
Ct1;t    1C t YH;t5;t + (1  )n

PH;t
Pt
 
11;t = 0;
the one with respect to Y F;t yields to
 (1  n)Vy(Y F;t; )t + 6;t   (1 + )a (Y F;t)9;t    1C t

PF;t
Pt

10;t = 0;
the one with respect to t yields to
 (1  n)V (Y F;t; ) + 7;t   7;t+1(F;t+1)(1+) = 0;
the one with respect to F t yields to
 

1
Kt

8;t + 10;t   (F;t) 110;t 1 = 0;
the one with respect to Kt yields to
F t
(Kt )2

8;t + 9;t   (F;t)(1+)9;t 1 = 0;
the one with respect to F;t yields to
0 =  (1 + )t 1(F;t)(1+) 17;t + (1 + )p(F;t) 
(1+)
1   1(F;t)
 27;t
 (1 + ) 

1   (

F;t)
 2p(F;t)
1+
 1  18;t   (1 + )Kt (F;t)(1+) 19;t 1
+(   1)(F;t) 2F t 10;t 1;
the one with respect to PF;t
Pt
yields to


PF;t
Pt
  1
Ct6;t   () 1C t Y F;t10;t + (1  )(1  n)

PF;t
Pt
 
11;t = 0:
We search for a steady-state solution of the above rst-order conditions in which
t = 

t = PH;t=Pt = PF;t=Pt = H;t = 

F;t = 1 and Ct = C, YH;t = YF;t = YH =
YF = Y and Ft = Kt = F t = K

t =
F = K = F  = K. In this steady-state
solution, the Lagrange multipliers take also constant values. In this steady-state
equations (A.1)(A.11) imply
a ( C + G) =  1 C  (A.12)
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YH = YF = Y = C + G
F = K = F  = K =  1 C  Y ;
where (A.12) can be solved for the steady-state value of C. In this steady-state
the above rst-order conditions imply that
Uc( C)  Vy( Y ; ) =  1 C [ + (1 + sG)](4 + 9)
n CVy( Y ; ) =   1 C1 [(1 + sG) + ]4   n(1  )11
(1  n) CVy( Y ; ) =   1 C1 [(1 + sG) + ]9   (1  n)(1  )11
nV ( Y ; ) = 2(1  )
(1  n)V ( Y ; ) = 7(1  )
5 =  4 = (1  ) 1 K 13
10 =  9 = (1  ) 1 K 18
1 = nVy( Y ;
) +  1 C 4
6 = (1  n)Vy( Y ; ) +  1 C 9
which can be uniquely solve for the values of the lagrange multipliers, given C; Y ,
K and the shocks. The conjectured solution exists.
We now focus on the non-cooperative deterministic solution and we show that
H;t = 

F;t = 1 is a Nash solution. For the home country, we show the existence
of stationary solution in which H;t = 1 at all times given the strategy F;t =
1 at all times of the other policymaker, and given initial conditions t0 1 = 1
and initial constraints Ft0 = F ;Kt0 = K such that F= K = 1. In particular
we note that F;t = 1 at all times implies that K

t = F

t and (a)
 (Y F;t)
1  =
() 1C t Y

F;t

PF;t
Pt

: The optimization problem for the home policymaker can be
written as
W 
1X
t=t0
t t0 [U(Ct)  V (YH;t; )t];
under the following constraints
YH;t =

PH;t
Pt
 
Ct + G; (A.13)
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t = t 1
(1+)
H;t + (1  )p(H;t) 
(1+)
1  ; (A.14)
p(H;t)
1+
 1 =

Ft
Kt

; (A.15)
Kt = a
 Y 1+H;t + Kt+1
(1+)
H;t+1 ; (A.16)
Ft = 
 1C t YH;t

PH;t
Pt

+  1H;t+1Ft+1; (A.17)
Y F;t =

PF;t
Pt
 
Ct + G
; (A.18)
(a) (Y F;t)
1+ = () 1C t Y

F;t

PF;t
Pt

; (A.19)
n

PH;t
Pt
1 
+ (1  n)

PF;t
Pt
1 
= 1; (A.20)
In what follows, we attach Lagrange multipliers #1;t, #2;t, #3;t, #4;t, #5;t, #6;t,
#7;t, #8;t to the constraints (A.13)-(A.20) and we also add multilipliers dated t0 to
the initial constraints Kt0 = K, Ft0 = F . The latter multipliers are normalized
in such a way that the resulting rst-order conditions take the same form at date
t0 as at all future dates. The rst-order conditions of the optimal problem with
respect to Ct yields to
0 = Uc(Ct) 

PH;t
Pt
 
#1;t + 
 1C  1t YH;t

PH;t
Pt

#5;t  

PF;t
Pt
 
#6;t +
+() 1C  1t Y

F;t

PF;t
Pt

#7;t;
the one with respect to YH;t yields to
 Vy(YH;t; )t + #1;t   (1 + )a Y H;t#4;t    1C t

PH;t
Pt

#5;t = 0;
the one with respect to t yields to
 V (YH;t; ) + #2;t   #2;t+1(1+)H;t+1 = 0;
the one with respect to Ft yields to
 

1
Kt

#3;t + #5;t    1H;t #5;t 1 = 0;
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the one with respect to Kt yields to
Ft
K2t

#3;t + #4;t   (1+)H;t #4;t 1 = 0;
the one with respect to H;t yields to
0 =  (1 + )t 1(1+) 1H;t #2;t + (1 + )p(H;t) 
(1+)
1   1 2H;t #2;t
 (1 + ) 
1  
 2
H;t #3;t   (1 + )Kt(1+) 1H;t #4;t 1   (   1) 2H;t Ft#5;t 1;
the one with respect to PH;t
Pt
yields to


PH;t
Pt
  1
Ct#1;t    1C t YH;t#5;t + (1  )n

PH;t
Pt
 
#8;t = 0;
the one with respect to Y F;t yields to
#6;t   () 1C t

PF;t
Pt

#7;t + (1 + )(a
) (Y F;t)
#7;t = 0;
the one with respect to PF;t
Pt
yields to


PF;t
Pt
  1
Ct#6;t   () 1C t Y F;t#7;t + (1  )(1  n)

PF;t
Pt
 
#8;t = 0:
We search for a steady-state solution of the above rst-order conditions in which
t = PH;t=Pt = PF;t=Pt = H;t = 1 and Ct = C, YH;t = YF;t = YH = YF = Y and
Ft = Kt = F = K. In this steady-state solution, the Lagrange multipliers take
also constant values. In this steady-state equations (A.13)(A.20) imply
a ( C + G) =  1 C  (A.21)
YH = YF = Y = C + G
F = K =  1 C  Y ;
where (A.21) can be solved for the steady-state value of C. In this steady-state
the above rst-order conditions imply that
Uc( C)  Vy( Y ; ) =  1 C [ + (1 + sG)](#4   #7)
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 CVy( Y ; ) =   1 C1 [(1 + sG) + ]#4   n(1  )#8
(1  n)(1  )#8 =  1 C1 [(1 + sG) + ]#7
V ( Y ; ) = #2(1  )
#5 =  #4 = (1  ) 1 K 1#3
#1 = Vy( Y ; ) + 
 1 C #4
#6 =   1 C #7
which can be uniquely solve for the values of the lagrange multipliers, given C; Y ,
K and the shocks. We note that setting H;t = 1 at all dates, given the initial
condition t0 = 1 and Ft = Kt = F = K, and given the strategy of the other
policymaker F;t = 1 implements uniquely the above steady-state allocation. The
same argument can be made for the other country. It follows that H;t = F;t = 1
at all dates is a Nash solution for the deterministic non-cooperative problem.s
Loss Functions Coe¢ cients in Section 3.2
In what follows we report the coe¢ cients and the target variables for the loss
functions of each single country for the special case in which  = 1 as in section
3.2. We have that iyh, 
i
yf
, iq, 
i
h
, if are parameters,that assumes the following
form:
yh = 
w
y [1  (1  n)a] + (1  n)b; yh = n

wy a  b

yf = (1  n)

wy a  b

; yf = 
w
y [1  na] + nb
q = (1  )(1  n) [na+ c(1  n)]
q = (1  )n [(1  n)a+ nc]
h =

ksc
[na+ c] ; h =
n
ksc
a
f =
(1  n)
ksc
a; f =

ksc
[(1  n) a+ c]
While the target variables in this case are given by:
~Y hH;t  (yh) 1
2664
(n+(1 n)c)
sc
a^W;t +
(1 n)(nd+(1 n)c)
sc
a^R;t
+
h
(1 n)a
sc
i  
^W;t + (1  n) ^R;t

+ 1
yh

nwy c7   (1  n) 1s 2c h7

G^t
+ 1
yh

nwy c8   (1  n) 1s 2c h8

G^t
3775
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~Y hF;t  (yf ) 1
2664
(1 n)a
sc
a^W;t   (1 n)n[e a]sc a^R;t
 
h
(1 n)a
sc
i  
^W;t   n^R;t

+ 1 n
yf

wy d7 + 
 1s 2c k7

G^t+
+1 n
yf

wy d8 + 
 1s 2c k8

G^t
3775
~T ht = (q)
 1
h
ea^R;t + e ((1  n)(1  2n)  ) G^R;t
i
~Y fH;t  (yh) 1
2664
na
sc
a^W;t +
n(1 n)(a e)
sc
a^R;t
 an
sc
 
^W;t + (1  n) ^R;t

+ n
yh

wy c7 + 
 1s 2c h7

G^t+
+ n
yh

wy c8 + 
 1s 2c h8

G^t
3775
~Y fF;t  (yf ) 1
2664
((1 n)+nc)
sc
a^W;t   n((1 n)d+nc)sc a^R;t
+an
sc
 
^W;t   n^R;t

+ 1
yf

(1  n)wy d7   n 1s 2c k7

G^t+
1
yf

(1  n)wy d8   n 1s 2c k8

G^t
3775
~T ft = (

q)
 1
h
ea^R;t   e (n(1  2n) + ) G^R;t
i
where
a  [sc(1 + )]
(1 + sc)
; b  (1  sc)
s2c(1 + sc)
; c  (1  sc)
(1 + sc)
; d  (sc + )
(1 + sc)
; e  (1  )
(1 + sc)
and the parameters c7; c8; d7; d8; h7; h8; k7 and k8 are dened in appendix B.
Proof of determinacy of the optimal cooperative solution
We show that the rst-order conditions (3.27)(3.31) combined with the con-
straints (3.22)(3.24) and the initial conditions '1; 1 and '2; 1 yield to a determi-
nate equilibrium. First we use (3.27)(3.31) and (3.24) to write (3.22) and (3.23)
in terms of only the lagrangian multipliers and the shocks as it follows
Et'1;t+1 =

1 +
1

+
#1


'1;t +
(1  n)#2

'2;t  
1

'1;t 1 +


ut (A.22)
Et'2;t+1 =

1 +
1

+
#3



'2;t +
n#2


'1;t  
1

'2;t 1 +


ut (A.23)
where
#1  ns
2
c
sc + 
+
(1  n)(sc +  )2
 (sc + 1)
;
#2  s
2
c
sc + 
  (sc +  )
2
 (sc + 1)
;
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#3  (1  n) s
2
c
sc + 
+
n(sc +  )
2
 (sc + 1)
;
  
sc
where we used y =
sc+
s2c
. In this case, given that  = 1; we have that  > 0,
#1 > 0 and #3 > 0. We can write (A.22) and (A.23) in the following form
Etzt+1 =

A1 A2
A3 0

zt +

B1
0

t (A.24)
where z0t  ['t 't 1] and 't  ['1;t '2;t]; 0t  [ut ut ], Aj with j = 1; 2; 3; and B1
are two by two matrices. In particular
A 

A1 A2
A3 0

A1 

a11 a12
a21 a22

A2 
   1 0
0   1

A3 

1 0
0 1

with
a11 

1 +
1

+
#1


> 0
a12  (1  n)#2

a21  n#2


a22 

1 +
1

+
#3



> 0
and B1 is a block-diagonal matrix with elements


, 


. In order to study deter-
minacy, we need to inspect the roots of the characteristic polynomial associated
with the matrix A which is
P ( ) =  4   (a11 + a22) 3 + (a11a22   a21a12 + 2 1) 2   (a11 + a22) 1 +  2:
First we note that
 1 2 3 4 = 
 2; (A.25)
 1 +  2 +  3 +  4 = a11 + a22 > 2(1 + 
 1); (A.26)
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moreover if P ( ) = 0 then P (  1 1) = 0 so that we can further conclude that
 1 2 = 
 1  3 4 = 
 1: (A.27)
Moreover, by Descartes sign rule all the roots are positive. We note that
P (1) = (1 +  1)2   (1 +  1)(a11 + a22) + a11a22   a21a12
=
sc
(sc + )  (sc + 1)
> 0
P (0) =  2 > 0
The fact that all the roots are positive and that P (1) > 0,P (0) > 0 imply that
there are either 0 or 2 real or complex roots or 4 complex roots within the unit
circle. Conditions (A.26) and (A.27) exclude the rst and latter possibilities. From
conditions (A.27), we can further conclude that the two roots are within the unit
circle. The unique and stable solution of the system is obtained with the following
steps. Let V the two by four matrix of left eigenvectors associated with the unstable
roots. By pre-multiplying the system (A.24) with V we obtain
Etkt+1 = kt + V Bt (A.28)
where  is a two by two diagonal matrix of the unstable eigenvalues on the diagonal
and kt  V zt. The unique and stable solution to (A.28) is given by
kt =  
1X
j=0
 jV BEtt+j
which implies that
't =  V  11 V2't 1   V  11
1X
j=0
 jV BEtt+j (A.29)
where V1 and V2 are such that V = [V1 V2]. Equation (A.29) characterizes the
optimal path of the vector 't given initial condition ' 1; the paths for yH , y

F , H ,
F , qt can be derived using the conditions (3.27)(3.31):
Proof of determinacy of the solution implemented by the targeting
rules.
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We now show that the targeting rules (3.36) and (3.37), combined with the
constraints (3.22) to (3.24) yield to a determinate equilibrium that coincides with
the optimal cooperative solution. We follow here an argument similar to Woodford
(2003, ch. 6). Let us dene '1;t and '2;t for all t   1 as
'1;t  wy yH;t; (A.30)
'2;t  wy yF;t; (A.31)
from which it follows that
wy s
2
cH;t =  ('1;t   '1;t 1); (A.32)
wy s
2
c

F;t =  ('2;t   '2;t 1): (A.33)
Using (3.24) and (A.30)-(A.33), we can then retrieve the system of equations (A.22)
and (A.23) which yields to a determinate equilibrium given the initial conditions
'1; 1  wy yH; 1;
'2; 1  wy yF; 1:
Indeed the lagrangian multiplier '1; 1 and '2; 1 measure the commitment to ex-
pectations taken in periods before time 0. The timeless perspective optimal policy
is the one that assigns a particular value to the commitment to expectations prior
to period 0 such that the resulting optimal policy is time invariant.
B Appendix
Appendix B is available under the homepage of the Authors.
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